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Bastin J. had said at trial:
I have come to the conclusion that however unlikely accident may be as
an explanation of the death it is not beyond all possibility and it is not
more unlikely than that this normal, cheerful, happy young man deliberately took his life.

In the Court of Appeal in delivering the decision of the majority
Schultz J. had used equally strong language. Ritchie J. speaking for
the Supreme Court in dismissing the appeal refused to view segments
of the lower judgments in isolation:
After considering the decisions of Bastin J. and Schultz J. in their entirety,
Ithe
cannot
say that and
theyimprobabilities
adopted any standard
other thancase
thatagainst
of weighing
probabilities
of the plaintiff's
those
of the of
defendant
and the
thatcomplete
having due
regardoftomotive
the seriousness
of the
the case
allegation
suicide and
absence
they con-

cluded the preponderance of evidence weighed in the plaintiff's favour.

The learned judge considered this approach to be in complete
accord with the rule accepted in earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court. 1 This was undoubtedly sufficient to dispose of the case but
Ritchie 3. felt compelled to deal with this strong dissent of Tritschler
J.A. in the Court of Appeal that had been relied on largely by the
appellant. The majority in the Court of Appeal had placed considerable weight on the fact that no evidence of motive had been produced
by the appellant. Ttschler J.A. felt that the failure of the appellant
to produce evidence of motive should never be decisive against him,
that the proof of suicide was to be sought in the circumstances of the
death and in his opinion these circumstances forced him to the conclusion th
h death was self-inflictete wtient.
hedat
Ritchie .
admitted that evidence of motive was of little probative value in
rebutting the presumption against suicide but in his opinion it did not
necessarily follow that the complete absence of evidence of motive
when taken in conjunction with the unnatural quality of the act of
self-destruction can never be a decisive factor in support of the theory
that death was accidental.
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Some of the above issues were dealt with by the Supreme Court
of Canada in this short case. However, no penetrating analysis was
attempted by that Court, which seemed to be content to adopt holus
bolus the reasoning of Owen J. in the Quebec Queen's Bench, Appeal
side.'
The Marconi Company claimed under a travel accident insurance
policy, issued by the insurance company, in respect of the accidental
death of one of its employees covered by the policy. He was killed
when driving alone, and when, after swerving back and forth across
the highway a number of times, his car left the road and collided
with a tree. The policy excluded indemnity in the event that the
insured was "in a state of intoxication" or if the death was caused
"by disease or natural causes." The defendant company denied liability
on the ground that the accident occurred whilst the victim was in a
state of intoxication within the meaning of the policy. The evidence
disclosed that he had been drinking about an hour previously and a
blood test made three days after the death disclosed a high content
of alcohol.
Despite this apparently damaging evidence the trial judge (influenced by contrary expert testimony) found that the insurance
company had not discharged the onus of proof which was on it.
On appeal, Owen J. speaking for the majority upheld the trial
judge by stating that he had not erred and did not apply the burden
of proof in criminal matters, but had
used the "balance of probabilities
2
test," the proper one in civil cases.
Considering whether or not the insurance company had proved
on a balance of probabilities that the deceased was intoxicated, Owen
J. agreed with the trial judge again. He too, felt that the presence in
the blood of such a high content of alcohol does not necessarily prove
intoxication. He accepted Dr. Rabinovitch's explanation for the high
content of alcohol and laid stress on the evidence of the deceased's acts
and movements before the accident which showed he was not intoxicated. Owen J. also doubted the reliability of the blood sample. The
body was not removed from the scene of the accident for one and
a half hours, the autopsy was performed by a medical student and the
blood sample test was made by a police officer.
The learned judge indicated that to be intoxicated one must be
affected "to a considerable or marked degree by the consumption of
alcohol". 3
Tremblay C.J. and Choquette J. dissented from the majority
view of the Quebec Appeal Court. The dissent is a weak one since they
didn't have the benefit of testing the credibility of the witnesses (like
1 The London & Lancashire Guarantee &Accident Co. of Canada v.
CanadianMarconi Company [19632 S.C.R. 106.
2 Ibid. at p. 399.
3 Ibid.
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Rabinovitch), so they accepted the evidence of alcohol in the blood
as the best evidence that the deceased was intoxicated. Furthermore,
neither judge doubted that the deceased had drunk enough alcohol
in one hour and ten minutes to induce intoxication in the average
man.
The Supreme Court of Canada simply adopts unanimously the
reasoning of Owen J. in dismissing the appeal. The court apparently
felt that.since it did not have the benefit of testing the credibility and
quality of the witnesses at trial, and since the majority on appeal had
agreed with the findings of the trial judge, there was no reason to
disturb these "concurrent findings." Therefore, the court reaffirms
reference to
their long held position on concurrent findings with
American Automobile Insurance Company v. Dickson.4
The issue of clause three of the contract is summarily dealt with
by the court. Reliance on clause three indicates the despair of counsel
when faced with the failure of clause five.
Owen J. in the first appeal clearly stated that he did not think
that the company had established the evidence required for the application of this exclusion."5 Yet, counsel persisted in focussing on a
statement by Owen J. that the deceased may have felt "ill or faint."
However, a brief glance at the case report shows that Owen J. was
just speculating about what might have caused the deceased's car
to zigzag. The possibilities of fainting or illness are only two of a
number of explanations offered by Owen J. by way of obiter dicta.
Thus, it is easy to understand the Supreme Court's impatience with
this ground of appeal.
This case points up the need for amendment of the Supreme
Court of Canada Act. 6 The five judges reaffirmed unanimously the
decision of the appeal court of Quebec, which had affirmed the trial
judge. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada thought so little of the
issues in this case that they adopted the7 reasons of Owen J. and
imply that the issues have been long settled.
The fact that an insurance company was the appellant in this
case is pertinent. Without the financial resources of this appellant,
it is unlikely that anyone else, with the well settled principles discussed in this case in mind would have gone further than the Appeal
Court deciion on the slight chance that the Supreme Court of Canada
might decide to ignore these principles.
Does this not point up a flaw? Section 2 of the Supreme Court Act
allows anyone as of right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
where the amount or value of the matter at issue exceeds ten
thousand dollars. Parliament apparently thought that the dollar
4 [19433 S.C.R. 149.

5 Supra, footnote 2 at p. 397.
6 R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, as am., by 1956, c. 48.

7 [1963] S.C.R. 106.

8 R.S.C. 1952, c. 259.
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figure was one effective test for cases which the Canadian Supreme
Court should hear.
It is submitted this subsection ought to be deleted. Section 38 (8)
affords ample protection to litigants who, in the opinion of the
highest court of their province, have a point of law which should be
adjudicated by the court of final appeal for our country. At the same
time it would eliminate this type of case and free our judges to consider thornier points of law more deeply and expeditiously.
With regard to the main issue of the case-the balance of probabilities has been entrenched in the Common law for years as the
test to be applied in civil matters,9 although our Canadian Supreme
Court did not finally settle it authoritatively until Hanes v. Wawanesa
Mutual Insurance Co.10 which is discussed elsewhere in this review.
The decision was a proper one and indeed could not have been
otherwise. The law is in a satisfactory state and it was left undisturbed
by this case. T.A.S.

i

INTERPRETATION

Bogock Seed Co. Ltd. v. C.P.R. , C.N.R., [1963] S.C.R. 247.
In 1897 an agreement was entered into between the C.P.R.
and the Crown by which a subsidy was granted to the C.P.R. in return for an agreement to charge reduced rates for certain "grains"
on the C.P.R. lines. Certain specified grains were listed but no reference was made to rapeseed. The question on appeal was whether
rapeseed is a "grain" within the meaning of the Crow's Nest Pass
Act 1897 and therefore entitled to a reduced rate.
Martland J. delivering the judgment of the court agreed with
the Board in dismissing the appeal and holding that "grain" did not
include rapeseed. He distinguished the case of British Coal Corp. v.
The King [1935] A.C. 500 which held that "in interpreting a constituent or organic statute, . .. that construction most beneficial to the
widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted." That case
did not apply here because the purpose of the Act was to give effect
to an agreement between two parties who only contemplated the effecting of a reduction in rates then applicable or what both parties,
at that time, regarded as being grain. The rule followed in this case

was stated in Sharpe v. Wakefield [1889] 22 Cl. B.D. 239 at 242 by

Lord Esher who said "... the words of a statute must be construed as
they would have been the day after the statute was passed, unless some
9 Cooper v. Blade (1858) 6 H.L. Cas. 746; Doe dem Devine v. Wilson et al.
(1855) 10 Moo. P.C.C. 502; Clark v. King (1921) 61 S.CR. 608; Smit v. Smith
and Smedman [1952] 2 S.C.R. 312; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Schlett [1945]
S.C.R. 289; IndustrialAcceptance Corp. v. Couture [1954] S.C.R. 34.
10 [1963] S.C.R. 154.

